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How Many Votes is Too Few? 
REBECCA GREEN* 
The 1918 influenza pandemic is believed to have depressed turnout in the 
midterm elections that year by around ten percent when compared to the 
previous midterm election. Few cast doubt on the 1918 election’s legitimacy at 
the time—even though that ten percent represented around 3,000,000 votes. As 
one commenter put it, “If just a fraction of the drop in turnout from 1914 to 1918 
was due to the presence of the flu, then the disease was responsible for hundreds 
of thousands of people not voting.” 
As the country gears up for November’s election, the specter of election 
disruption again looms large. Disruptions —pandemic flare ups, security issues, 
weather events—may significantly depress turnout. If this happens, how few 
votes is too few for an election result to be considered legitimate? How is a court 
likely to evaluate depressed turnout in the context of available post-election 
remedies? 
First, a parade of potential horribles. What if a superstorm hits days before 
November 3rd? What if, due to massive poll worker shortages, a state shutters 
a significant number of polling locations, preventing thousands from casting 
ballots? What if a foreign cyberattack cripples a state’s power grid on the 
morning of Election Day? Under numerous scenarios, unexpected events could 
make it impossible for a large number of voters to cast ballots in November. 
As Michael Morley studiously documents in his article on election 
emergencies, the vast majority of state statutes lack clear language addressing 
election disruptions nor do many state emergency statutes clearly delegate 
power or provide specific guidance to state officials to manage disruptions that 
threaten turnout. The events of the past six months have served as a much-
needed wake up call to state officials who have been working diligently to 
address new realities of running elections during emergencies. Still, the 
likelihood that state responses to emergencies that impact elections—the current 
pandemic and/or others—will fail a significant number of voters remains. 
Professor Stephen Huefner has looked carefully at remedies available for failed 
elections.  
This short post examines the contours of a potential numerical trigger: how 
many votes does it take for an election to credibly capture the will of the people? 
How has this question played into courts’ analyses of when to order election 
remedies? 
In the United States, turnout is chronically low. Many U.S. primary 
elections are lucky to pass the twenty-percent mark. During presidential election 
years, a greater number of voters cast ballots. But even when the will to vote is 
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strong, circumstances prevent some portion of voters in every election from 
casting ballots, whether it is car trouble, the inability to get off work on Election 
Day, or a myriad other reasons. 
When eligible voters are unable to cast ballots—even when the burden 
prevents a potentially outcome-determinative number of voters from voting—
courts typically treat what they deem “ordinary burdens” as insufficient to 
warrant relief.  
But we are not living in ordinary times. Since the coronavirus outbreak, 
courts have begun to take extraordinary measures to protect the right to vote. As 
Rick Pildes convincingly argues, the coronavirus pandemic appears to be 
emboldening lower federal courts to force states to take steps to take voter-
protective measures. (So far, the Supreme Court does not seem quite as willing.) 
These federal decisions have focused on the extent to which states must 
accommodate voters because of extraordinary circumstances before Election 
Day (for example, making absentee voting more widely available). But if 
measures before Election Day, whether by courts or state officials, fail to 
safeguard access for a significant number of voters in November, at what point 
(if ever) does an election become illegitimate? Should the question hinge on 
how many voters are impacted? If so, how many must that number be?  
Can we agree that if all voters are prevented from casting ballots an election 
is illegitimate? In State v. Marcotte, a Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision 
from 1952, state officials rescheduled an election day after a massive snowstorm 
hit. In rejecting a challenge to the outcome of that rescheduled election, the court 
noted that, “[t]here was a storm of such unusual proportions and such 
unexpected violence that it might well be considered that there was no election 
due to ‘an act of God.’” In that instance, no votes were cast (the city had 21,252 
registered voters).  
Marcotte therefore supplies precedent for the idea that if no voters can vote, 
an election should not stand. That seems right. But what if some voters are able 
to cast valid ballots? How many is enough?  
New York has an answer to this question on the books. A New York statute 
provides that if less than twenty-five percent of registered voters in a city, town 
or village cast ballots “as the direct consequence of a fire, earthquake, tornado, 
explosion, power failure, act of sabotage, enemy attack, or other disaster,” a 
county or state board of elections may authorize “an additional day of election” 
in that jurisdiction (which must be completed within twenty days of the original 
election and voting must be in person). 
New York’s legislature passed this law in the wake of a devastating blackout 
in 1977 when the Northeast power grid went dark for twenty-five hours. New 
York City bore the brunt of the disruption with widespread looting and subway 
failures. The event led the New York legislature to enact its unique statutory fix 
in case catastrophe should prevent a significant number of voters from casting 
ballots.  




We might be able to agree that a result when one hundred percent of 
registered voters are unable to cast ballots is illegitimate; we might even agree 
that, as in New York, if fewer than twenty-five percent of registered voters cast 
ballots an election should be extended or rescheduled. But what if a disruption 
stops say forty percent of voters from casting ballots? Should a post-election 
remedy be available? 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in McNally v. Tollander thought yes. In that 
case, a ballot shortage prevented forty percent of the electorate from voting in a 
referendum. Because the election did not involve a candidate for office, 
Wisconsin’s contest statute was not available to challenge the result. Not to be 
deterred, the Wisconsin Supreme Court voided the election holding that the 
deprivation of the right to vote violated Wisconsin’s constitution. Quoting an 
earlier case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the  
right of a qualified elector to cast a ballot . . . which shall be free and equal, is 
one of the most important of the rights guaranteed to him by the [state] 
constitution. If citizens are deprived of that right, which lies at the very basis 
of our democracy, we will soon cease to be a democracy. 
Forty percent of voters unable to cast ballots was too much for the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court. But other courts have been less open to overturning 
the results of an election due to disruption on this basis. In the early 1960s, for 
example, the town of Springville, Nebraska held a vote on a school bond issue. 
In the days leading up to the election, a blizzard left much of the area snowbound 
(even though election day itself was reportedly mild and sunny). While we do 
not know the exact number, the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that a 
“substantial number of electors who were wholly or partially isolated by drifts 
could not get out to vote.” Nevertheless, the justices refused to invalidate the 
election, holding that, “in the absence of fraud, the courts will not ordinarily 
consider the effect of votes not actually cast at an election.” 
In Jenkins v. Williamson-Butler, a 2004 case involving a local election in 
New Orleans, a candidate sought a new election after substantial irregularities 
affected an estimated twenty to twenty-five percent of voters. According to 
Louisiana’s contest statute, a remedy is available if “the number of qualified 
voters who were denied the right to vote by the election officials was sufficient 
to change the result in the election, if they had been allowed to vote.”  
In that election, one-third of the city’s voting machines arrived late to 
polling locations preventing voters from casting ballots. Then-Secretary of State 
Fox McKeithen proclaimed that the “election was the biggest fiasco in New 
Orleans election history.” On the basis of this extraordinary circumstance, the 
appeals court affirmed the trial court’s decision to void the election and hold a 
new one. 
But note an interesting feature of this statutory remedy: a significant number 
of voters need not be impacted. Louisiana’s statute keys the question to the 




number of voters impacted being outcome determinative. Depending on how 
close the election, that number could be quite small. If a candidate wins by three 
votes and the number of foiled voters is five, presumably the contest would 
hinge on whether those five voters were wrongly excluded from the count. If a 
post-election remedy is sought through a contest statute like Louisiana’s, 
disenfranchisement therefore need not be widespread for the result of an election 
to be successfully contested. 
Not all courts perk up when an outcome-determinative number of voters are 
prevented from casting ballots. In 1920, the Idaho Supreme Court in Harper v. 
Dotson refused to count fifteen ballots dispositive to the outcome of a probate 
judge election. The day before the November 5 election, at the height of the 
1918 flu pandemic with quarantine orders in place, a group of faculty and 
students quarantining at their school petitioned the local elections board to 
establish an emergency polling place there. The local elections board granted 
the last-minute petition and fifteen students and faculty cast ballots. The election 
for probate judge came down to four votes. The loser filed a contest challenging 
inclusion of those fifteen ballots.  
The Idaho Supreme Court tossed the ballots as contrary to state law, which 
expressly prohibited the elections board from establishing new polling locations 
later than July preceding an election. In that case, the ravages of the pandemic 
did not sway the Idaho Supreme Court to bend state law. Why? Notice and 
fairness issues proved critical to the court’s opinion. The special treatment local 
officials gave these fifteen voters were not afforded to all voters likewise stuck 
in quarantine. Had the accommodation been uniformly available further in 
advance of the election, the outcome may well have been different. After all, the 
court did cite a South Dakota Supreme Court recommendation that courts decide 
election cases with “leaning towards liberality.”  
As this review reveals, the choice often comes down to whether or not to 
bend the law to accommodate voters disenfranchised by circumstances. The 
resolutions courts arrive upon are often fact-specific and deeply intertwined 
with decision makers’ perception of the degree of burden voters faced and the 
fairness issues implicated. In the end, state statutory and constitutional rules do 
not typically provide bright line rules to help courts navigate when enough 
voters have been excluded for an election remedy to become necessary.  
What about federal law? Does it provide answers? One potential source of 
reference is the Voting Rights Act (VRA) through its erstwhile Section 4 
preclearance formula. To determine which states had egregious enough histories 
of voting discrimination, the VRA’s original coverage formula targeted, among 
other things, states in which fewer than fifty percent of the voting age population 
actually voted in the presidential election of November 1964. That, according 
to the designers of the Voting Rights Act, signified evidence of an election 
undemocratic enough to warrant federal oversight. This fifty percent threshold 
marks the closest federal statutory law comes to setting a floor for low 
participation rates to constitute a problematic election.  




What about the U.S. Constitution? Might it provide greater protection than 
state law when disruption prevents voters from casting ballots? 
In Shannon v. Jacobowitz, David Jacobowitz appeared to beat his opponent, 
incumbent Matthew Shannon, by twenty-five votes in a local election for Town 
Supervisor in New York. After the election, officials discovered that a voting 
machine had malfunctioned. While 295 voters had used the machine in the 
election, only 156 votes had registered; it appeared 139 voters had been 
disenfranchised through no fault of their own. Investigators later determined that 
at least sixty-nine of those voters intended to cast ballots for Shannon.  
Voters filed a § 1983 claim in federal court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief. Voters claimed that the Board of Elections violated the due 
process clause by depriving them of their right to have their votes counted. After 
the district court granted injunctive relief, the Second Circuit reversed, citing an 
Eleventh Circuit opinion for the principle that only in extraordinary 
circumstances will a challenge to a state or local election rise to the level of a 
constitutional deprivation. Ultimately, the Second Circuit overturned the district 
court’s injunctive relief. It found dispositive that government officials had not 
engaged in intentional, willful misconduct.  
This holding signals a potential weakness in applying a due process frame 
to election disruptions. Typically due process claims require state action: the 
state must act to deprive people of constitutional rights. But the root of election 
disruptions may be external forces beyond the state’s control. Plaintiffs are left 
making a difficult argument: that the state’s inaction in the face of dire election 
circumstances constitutes a due process violation.  
Former Department of Justice attorney and Loyola election law professor 
Justin Levitt suggests that perhaps courts should distinguish state election 
inaction in the due process analysis for a simple reason: the government is 
responsible for elections. If a natural disaster decimates a state’s abortion 
facilities, a government failure to provide funds to rebuild is not a due process 
violation. In that instance, the government is one step removed; it is not the 
abortion provider. In the case of elections, the government is the responsible 
actor. This unique feature of elections should impact the due process 
assessment. 
This distinction may explain why some federal courts have ruled that 
“fundamental unfairness” in elections may violate the due process clause of the 
U.S. constitution. In Bennett v. Yoshina, a case involving contested ballots 
already cast, the Ninth Circuit noted that, “[s]everal appellate courts, including 
our own, have held that an election is a denial of substantive due process if it is 
conducted in a manner that is fundamentally unfair.” In Griffin v. Burns, the 
First Circuit held that “if the election process itself reaches the point of patent 
and fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process clause may be 
indicated.”  
But, in the context of an election disruption that prevents voters from casting 
ballots, attempting to judge the boundaries of “patent and fundamental 




unfairness” puts us back at square one: how many voters must be thwarted (and 
by what means) for an election to be deemed patently and fundamentally unfair?  
The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause or Voting Rights Act 
claims may be levied to challenge an election outcome featuring depressed 
turnout born unequally by minority voters. As we have witnessed already, 
pandemic-related disruptions magnify racial inequality in voting. The equal 
protection and VRA analysis may not help discern an exact number of minority 
voters who must have been prevented from casting ballots, but if that number is 
significant and is borne unequally, if the circumstances are sufficiently 
extraordinary, and if the state with adequate notice failed to act, such claims 
should be strong. 
So how many voters is too few? Whether the question is resolved through a 
state statute, a state constitution, or even a federal constitutional claim, U.S. law 
(other than in New York state and states with contest statutes similar to 
Louisiana’s) provides no exact figure for a low turnout election to be considered 
a failure.  
It is hard not to look at the cascade of problems that have already unfolded 
during the presidential primary season and wonder what we are in for in 
November.  
If pandemic-related disruptions plague the general election, one view is that 
states are already on notice that problems are likely. If states fail to protect voter 
access with known risks looming, courts should draw inferences against states 
and in favor of voters if a significant number of voters are in fact prevented from 
casting ballots because of coronavirus-related disruptions. 
Another view is that voters are likewise on notice (at least with respect to 
disruptions related to the current pandemic). Courts might expect voters to 
exercise extra vigilance and foresight. The Supreme Court’s favorable view 
towards Wisconsin primary voters who requested absentee ballots sufficiently 
early portends this perspective.  
We cannot know what disruptions, if any, are to come. But neither does it 
appear that courts can rely on a mystical threshold to determine when an election 
has accurately captured the people’s will.  
What is clear is that state officials and legislatures must exercise every 
effort—comporting with legal and financial constraints—to ensure eligible 
voters can cast ballots in November. After Election Day, if a significant number 
of voters were in fact unable to cast ballots, courts should act to the greatest 
extent applicable law allows to protect the right to vote. To repeat the words of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in McNally, “if citizens are deprived of that right, 
which lies at the very basis of our democracy, we will soon cease to be a 
democracy.” 
